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Abstract: Climate compatible development (CCD) aims to help people improve their lives in the face
of climate threats without exacerbating these threats for current and future generations. It is proving
an attractive concept to both academics and practitioners. However, the social justice implications of
CCD have not yet been comprehensively explored and an absence of adequate evaluation frameworks
has led to multiple, legitimate cross-scalar social justice claims being marginalised. This article
develops a framework to guide holistic social justice evaluation of CCD initiatives across levels
and scales. Underpinning this framework is a social justice approach that embraces particularism,
pluralism and procedural justice. Drawing on existing research, the framework is used to explore the
implications of the Clean Development Mechanism for recognition, participation and distribution
in the Least Developed Countries. Findings show that achieving social justice through CCD is
not a given; rather, the social justice implications of CCD differ within and between levels and
scales. We conclude by suggesting ways in which our framework can be applied to augment
knowledge on CCD. Understanding the processes through which social justices and injustices are
created is integral to considerations of whether and how CCD should be used to underpin a new
development landscape.
Keywords: social justice; climate change; mitigation; adaptation; equity; triple-wins; trade-offs; clean
development mechanism
1. Introduction
Climate change mitigation, adaptation and development can have significant consequences
for one another [1]. With efforts to implement the Sustainable Development Goals intensifying
since their agreement in 2015 and the operationalisation of the 2015 Paris Agreement, consensus
is emerging that development, mitigation and adaptation are usefully addressed using a joined-up
approach [2,3]. Such integration can increase harmonisation, reduce conflicts and help harness
co-benefits for each component [4]. In this context, climate compatible development (CCD) has been
proposed as the basis of a development landscape able to manage the threats and opportunities
that climate change presents for social and economic progress [5]. Seeking “triple-wins” across
development, mitigation and adaptation, CCD is defined as “development that minimises the harm
caused by climate impacts, while maximising the many human development opportunities presented
by a low emissions, more resilient future” [5].
Tackling climate change and development problems together is attractive yet challenging for
policymakers and practitioners. CCD appears, at face value, to be ethical, and by seeking to ensure that
development, mitigation and adaptation point in the same direction, also seems efficient. The concept
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has momentum and is fast becoming mainstreamed within the climate change and development
lexicon [6].
CCD is being operationalised through policies, programmes and projects that, individually or
in combination with one another, aim to further development, mitigation and adaptation across
the developing world [7,8]. Governments and donors are currently investing in CCD to reduce
vulnerabilities [6]. The United Kingdom’s Department for International Development (DfID) considers
that CCD is integral to helping the Least Developed Countries respond to climate and development
shocks [9]. Ecosystem-based approaches, which protect, generate and utilise natural capital, have been
shown to have particular promise for achieving CCD triple-wins, notably sustainable land management
practices that span the water-energy-food nexus [10].
Thus far, CCD’s operationalisation has outpaced academic inquiry into the concept. Research
is nevertheless beginning to critique the origins, design and implementation of CCD (e.g., [11–13]).
However, this research represents a small proportion of the overall CCD literature base, which tends
to focus on appraising the feasibility of achieving CCD goals in different settings (e.g., [4,14]) and
proposing strategies for advancing CCD (e.g., [6,15]). More critical research is required because,
like other policy narratives, the concept represents a subjective way of viewing the world. Its use of
discursive storylines can alter perceptions and, in-so-doing, shape what is included (and excluded)
in policymaking and practice. Consequently, CCD justifies certain types of action but could side-line
alternative responses and conceptual framings [12].
One pressing research gap relates to the social justice implications of pursuing CCD goals
in different settings. Social justice is concerned with how opportunities, privileges, burdens and
disadvantages are allocated within society [16]. It comprises two interdependent pillars: procedural
and distributive justice. Procedural justice is achieved when individuals and groups have opportunities
to meaningfully participate and have their values, cultures and identities recognised through,
in this case, CCD decision-making processes [17]. Achieving distributive justice through CCD requires
that procedurally fair decision-making processes are used to determine allocations of the material
benefits and any negative side-effects that result from initiatives [18].
CCD operates in a multi-level context where several forms of uncertainty mean myriad values and
interests coexist and conflict with one another [19,20]. Decisions about CCD are taken and its outcomes
experienced across diverse governance levels and temporal and spatial scales [21]. Development,
mitigation and adaptation are also each valued differently by individuals and collectives operating
across these dimensions. Consequently, stakeholder priorities for, and perspectives about CCD,
may not align [22]. Social justice approaches that consider issues of procedure and distribution can
help adjudicate between competing viewpoints [16].
It has been acknowledged that social justice approaches are required to guide and analyse
climate and development actions [7]. Distribution issues are central to CCD planning [5] and are
being addressed through nascent research (e.g., [11,23,24]). However, albeit with notable exceptions
(e.g., [25]), procedural considerations have received less attention in the literature. Neither the
distributive nor procedural justice implications of initiatives pursuing CCD triple-wins have been
well-explored, while analyses that consider linkages between procedural and distributive justice are
scarce (exceptions include [26,27]).
A shortage of frameworks for guiding cross-level, multi-scalar justice analyses of CCD betrays the
importance of social justice research. The climate justice literature has not yet produced frameworks
for guiding and evaluating policy and practice in an integrated, systematic and rigorous manner.
This is because:
(1) Universalist propositions have dominated the literature and marginalised multiple, legitimate
social justice claims;
(2) Pluralism—the diversity of priorities and perspectives held by individuals and groups—has been
overlooked within distributive justice thinking; and
(3) Procedural justice has received inadequate attention.
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This article aims to develop a framework that targets this gap. In so doing, we contribute to
the emergence of a more critical CCD research agenda. This is urgently required to uncover the real
consequences that CCD has for target populations. Four objectives aid fulfilment of our aim. These are to:
(1) Set out the parameters of uncertainty and value plurality in the CCD operating context;
(2) Detail the three aforementioned limitations of the climate justice literature;
(3) Present a framework that addresses these limitations; and
(4) Apply this framework to explore the social justice opportunities afforded to the Least Developed
Countries (LDCs) under the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM)—a policy instrument
designed to finance CCD in developing countries.
2. CCD: Navigating Uncertainty and Value Plurality
Knowledge of climate change is incomplete due to constrained understanding of the complex
Earth system and limitations inherent in climate models [20]. This makes precise predictions about
changes (especially in regions and localities) impossible and the outcomes of mitigation and adaptation
activities uncertain. There may also be unknown, undiscovered forms of uncertainty [28]. Meanwhile,
development also suffers from chronic data shortages and commonly relies upon outdated methods.
Low capacity means data collection is often infrequent, irregular and incomplete [29].
The problem of uncertainty surrounding CCD initiatives is complicated in a world marked by
vast, socially-constructed inequality in terms of climate change and development issues. As Barrett [30]
argues, climate change constitutes the source of a double inequality with “an inverse distribution
of risk and responsibility”. Uneven development patterns are also human creations that condition
populations’ capacities to respond to change [31].
Combatting this inequality through CCD approaches requires multi-stakeholder working across
global, national and local scales [32]. The term “stakeholders” refers to actors or organisations with
an interest in, or who are impacted by, CCD [33]. They include donor agencies, non-governmental
organisations (NGOs), private organisations, national and local governments, technical experts and
local people [34]. Stakeholders’ cultures and value positions will condition how they approach
uncertain climate and development problems [35]. Moreover, belief systems motivating some
stakeholders’ priorities and actions may not be fully comprehensible to others [19].
Debate about what is to be developed, and how development should take place, is commonplace,
irrespective of climate change concerns [36]. In the context of uncertainty and disparate value positions,
stakeholder priorities for CCD will likely conflict with one another. How to progress mitigation and
adaptation and balance them against one another within policy remains contentious, with divergence
between nation-states around these issues having created difficulties for global climate negotiations,
complicating the achievement of the 2015 Paris Agreement [37].
What constitutes mitigation and adaptation is also contentious. Mitigation and adaptation policy
(e.g., under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC)) is commonly
directed by knowledge produced by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) [38,39].
However, centuries-old strategies adopted by developing world populations for dealing with climate
stresses have gone unrecognised within adaptation projects that are funded and executed by external
actors. Likewise, the mitigation potential of indigenous livelihood strategies has not been well
acknowledged [40]. Efforts to promote the IPCC as the “epistemic authority on matters of climate
policy” [41] may therefore serve to legitimise certain mitigation and adaptation actions (and actors)
while delegitimising others, particularly those implemented by indigenous populations [42].
By recognising the importance of development, mitigation and adaptation simultaneously,
CCD could encourage common ground between different constituencies [14]. However, the literature
on policy mechanisms (e.g., the CDM, REDD+, voluntary carbon market standards) seeking
multiple-wins across development, mitigation and adaptation suggests that this will not be a given.
There are concerns that interventions tend to pursue mitigation benefits at the expense of development
and adaptation [34,43–45]. For example, Mustalahti et al. [12] show that local development priorities
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(e.g., water access, food security) are poorly reconciled with global mitigation goals through
REDD+ design in Tanzania. Stakeholders involved in CCD initiatives may concurrently seek to
pursue other agendas whilst furthering development, mitigation and/or adaptation, which could
exacerbate disagreement.
CCD outcomes could also create conflict. Initiatives that pursue development, mitigation and
adaptation are sometimes perceived to deliver negative side-effects. Suckall et al. [46] draw on local
testimonies to contend that autonomous local adaptations in Zanzibar have undermined mitigation
and development. This is because farmers spend longer on farms when climate impacts reduce
agricultural productivity. This reduces the time that farmers have to spend investing in alternative
livelihood activities, some of which can also create mitigation benefits (e.g., forestry activities).
Tompkins et al. [11] analyse policies related to agriculture, aquaculture, fisheries, forestry and tourism
with the potential to create CCD triple-wins in Belize, Kenya, Vietnam and Ghana. They argue that,
although some of these policies can create triple-wins, others fail and often create unanticipated
negative impacts for development, mitigation and adaptation.
“Do no harm” principles are often mainstreamed within policy mechanisms [47,48], meaning
negative side-effects ought to be unintended and unanticipated ex ante. However, theoretically,
they could also be anticipated and/or intentional. The popularised depiction of CCD focusses on
“wins” and “winners” but pays little attention to negative side-effects that might be created through
its pursuit [11]. This is unsurprising as discussing “winners” and “losers” in the context of climate
change is highly contentious and often avoided [31].
Points of contention will likely differ across spatial and temporal scales because development,
mitigation and adaptation outcomes are experienced differently by actors operating across these
dimensions. Strategies that benefit certain individuals and groups can disadvantage others [27].
Likewise, those deemed successful in the present may or may not be configured to deal with future
conditions [49].
Conflict could also emerge over issues only indirectly related to climate and development
outcomes. This is because CCD has consequences for stakeholders who are not target beneficiaries.
For example, framing interventions in line with multiple-win approaches is politically expedient for
donors [50] and might help development organisations access finance that is increasingly channelled
into CCD-related initiatives [15]. Conversely, stakeholders could face auxiliary side-effects. CCD may,
for instance, force project developers to spread scarce resources thinly in pursuit of simultaneous
triple-wins. Auxiliary outcomes may also differ across spatial and temporal dimensions.
In sum, CCD represents a complicated policy problem that is characterised by uncertainty and
disparate value positions. How CCD initiatives are framed depends on which subjective beliefs are
“winning-out” in this context. By encouraging simultaneous consideration of development, mitigation
and adaptation, CCD thinking could help reconcile diverse stakeholder priorities. However, doing so
is likely to be contentious and complex. Multi-level, cross-scalar CCD outcomes can also create new
points of contention.
Physical science approaches and economic methodologies that draw upon quantitative data
and approach problems from particular epistemological positions (e.g., climate science models,
rational-choice theory, and assumption-based planning approaches) are crucial support-tools for
climate and development planning and response design [51]. However, these approaches are incapable
of adjudicating between competing stakeholder priorities and perspectives, especially in the context
of uncertainty related to complex systems [51]. This is because they perform best when facts are
undisputed and knowledge is perfect [51]. Social justice approaches can help reconcile different
viewpoints and are therefore required to advance CCD. In the next section, existing climate justice
approaches that could aid the design, implementation and evaluation of CCD are discussed.
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3. Debating Climate Justice: A Literature Review
Social justice has been at the forefront of climate change debates ever since it became a major
political issue [52]. The same is true of sustainable development debates, where the extent to which the
concept has reduced or exacerbated global inequalities is disputed [36]. While not initially addressed
explicitly, social justice considerations formed a major part of early international-level climate policy
decisions informing, for example, the UNFCCC’s guiding principle: common but differentiated
responsibilities and respective capabilities [53]. Recently, social justice has been dealt with more
directly, and was identified as crucial for fostering progress towards the 2015 Paris Agreement [53].
Sub-national climate action also has social justice at its core: for example, the Scottish Government
has established a Climate Justice Fund to finance project-level mitigation and adaptation activities in
developing nations [54].
However, conceptions of social justice that permeate climate research and practice are currently
inadequate. Multiple different theoretical perspectives exist that consider social justice in divergent
ways and propose unique approaches to navigate the value plurality surrounding CCD. This section
explores the debates and disagreements on climate justice. It is argued that dominant conceptions
of climate justice are limited in three ways: universalist propositions dominate; distributive justice
approaches overlook pluralism; and procedural justice is given inadequate attention. This makes them
unsuitable for the evaluation of CCD.
3.1. Limitation 1: Universalism Dominates
The merits of different social justice approaches have been debated by philosophers and social
scientists for centuries. While by no means homogenous groupings, four main “types” of social justice
theory are pre-eminent: utilitarianism; egalitarianism; libertarianism; and contractarianism [55].
Utilitarianism seeks to balance societal costs and benefits to maximise aggregate social welfare
(however defined) [55]. It is unconcerned with inequalities that this might create: “justice is what
is beneficial to the most” [56]. Egalitarians see all people as inherently equal and demand the full
removal of inequality [55]. For libertarians (e.g., [57,58]), social intervention that prevents individuals
from making free choices is unjust. All societal consequences stemming from free decision-making are
considered fair, even when extreme inequalities are created. By contrast, Rawls and other contractarians
dictate that the least privileged should be made as well off as possible. They argue that if individuals
were unaware of their abilities’ and socio-economic positions, agreeing upon a set of rules with which
to organise society would be conceivable [59].
Each theory type has gained some traction within climate research and has been epistemologically
embedded within policy proposals and/or scientific models. Much climate science and economics
literature recourses to utilitarian assumptions, considering that climate impacts “matter” only when
they affect well-being and can be quantified monetarily [60]. Egalitarian thinking permeates proposals
calling for equal entitlements to the atmosphere, equal burdens in dealing with climate change and
equal rights to be protected from its impacts [61]. Proposals that demand the right to be protected from
climate impacts caused by others (e.g., [62]) also display libertarian thinking. Hence, individual value
positions can be motivated by dissimilar and incommensurable rationales [63]. Rawlsian thinking
manifests itself in calls to protect the most vulnerable to climate impacts [18]. Notwithstanding
criticisms for being deterministic, and disempowering those deemed “vulnerable” [64], the concept of
vulnerability has been institutionalised within climate research and practice [65].
Dominant theories differ radically in most respects but are analogous in one crucial sense:
they present universal laws for advancing social justice. Objectively deciding between them is
fundamentally impossible [19]. Competing theories appear flawless to supporters but unsatisfactory
to proponents of alternative perspectives [55]. Theories concentrate on identifying “optimally just”
societal arrangements, meaning they also fail to provide suitable methodologies for comparing and
improving existing societal arrangements [19]. This limits their real-world relevance. The failure to
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agree on a common social justice approach [66] and operationalise key principles (e.g., what constitutes
equal burden sharing in practice) has long hindered international climate talks.
Universalist theories regard social justice principles as consistent across time and space.
Consequently, they overlook how different contexts and cultures shape social justice claims [67].
Drawing on empirical research in India, Fisher [7] demonstrates that multiple identities, development
inequalities and diverse experiences with climate impacts and policy outcomes translates into myriad
climate justice claims. When analysed across different levels and scales, varied interpretations of social
justice and injustice emerge [68]. Social justice is “negotiated and generated in the context of conflicting
views and interests” [18]. Hence, universalism should give way to particularism at and across a range
of scales.
Excluding consideration of intergenerational trade-offs, climate justice is predominantly conceived
as a static ideal to be operationalised within the UNFCCC. Agency is granted only to sovereign
governments, meaning subnational considerations are underexplored [52]. However, what is valued
by national governments is not necessarily valued by other stakeholders. Diverse priorities for
REDD+ and the Clean Development Mechanism, for example, exist at national and local levels [22,26].
Values and experiences also differ within scales (e.g., [69]). There are increasing attempts to engage
with sub-national climate justice (e.g., [70,71]). However, multi-level, cross-scalar analyses are
scarce [72]. The social justice implications of decisions determining the scales at which climate
responses are designed and implemented have also been overlooked [7].
Theorists’ own experiences and consciousness mean attempts to develop universal justice laws
may be fundamentally particular in nature and suffer from philosophical incoherence [73]. Moreover,
attempts to determine some universal common ground in a multiverse of disparate realities can be so
abstract as to be irrelevant for practical usage [67]. While some (e.g., [74]) argue that multiplicity makes
social justice “meaningless”, it is acknowledgement of this diversity that showcases the importance
of social justice research and practice. The task for theorists and practitioners is not to determine
universal theory but to understand and reconcile competing priorities about how social life ought to
be arranged.
3.2. Limitation 2: Pluralism Is Overlooked within Distributive Justice Thinking
The pre-eminence of universalism is mirrored by a near-exclusive focus on questions of
distribution within the literature [18]. Studies examining distribution within CCD and climate policy
more widely have drawn on a range of inter-disciplinary techniques (e.g., [46,75,76]) Distributive
justice theories diverge in terms of what ought to be distributed (e.g., income, wealth, employment,
opportunities, utility, and costs) and how [77]. However, linked to the dominance of universalism,
climate justice theories have dictated which societal goods are in need of distribution.
Owing to the perceived urgency of promoting action to reduce the causes of climate change,
climate justice debates centred upon the costs and benefits of mitigation until the mid-2000s [18].
Subsequently, there has been a growing realisation that: (1) climate change impacts are already
threatening development progress; (2) climate vulnerabilities are linked to pre-existing global
inequalities; and, therefore; and (3) adaptation must go beyond developing large-scale infrastructure to
protect against future climate change [1]. In light of this, social justice dilemmas related to adaptation
needs and the provision of resources for meeting these needs have been articulated. However,
studies often focus on climate impacts and adaption needs rather than the consequences of adaptation
interventions (e.g. [78]).
That mitigation and adaptation are mediated through development issues (e.g., health,
water access) is similarly under-considered. Climate change and development are deeply intertwined
and one cannot be discussed without reference to the other [1]. It follows that climate justice should be
concerned about the climate but also uneven development processes. However, climate injustices are
often conceived as separate from developmental injustices [7].
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Belying their multi-dimensional nature, the distributional outcomes of mitigation, adaptation and
climate impacts on development are also conceived narrowly. Largely, distributive justice is discussed
in terms of emissions reductions, finance and technology [37]. Meanwhile, dimensions that are more
difficult to quantify (e.g., loss-of-life and environmental degradation) are overlooked [53]. Social justice
approaches also dictate mechanisms by which distribution should proceed, independent of context
and the particular societal good in question (e.g., dominant Rawlsian social justice approaches consider
that climate strategies should be configured to benefit the most vulnerable) [79].
However, if the nature of social justice is context-specific, then logically, the types of goods to
be distributed and the mechanisms by which that distribution occurs must follow suit [67]. Multiple
identities, global inequalities and diverse cross-scalar experiences with climate impacts and policy
outcomes make it impossible to define a universal standard of distributive justice with regards to CCD.
Rather, pluralism—the diversity of priorities and perspectives held by individuals and groups—is
ubiquitous, manifesting itself in heterogeneous beliefs about what is to be distributed and how,
which differ across governance levels and (spatial and temporal) scales [7].
Communities create their own societal goods, the relevance and importance of which is derived
from meanings attached to them [67]. While certain societal goods may have analogues in alternative
communities, they will unlikely carry precisely the same meaning [67]. Since they can have radically
different properties, each specific societal good in a particular society will have its own distribution
criterion. Thus, different “spheres” of distribution are created [80].
As different spheres of distribution are incommensurable, they must be kept strictly separate.
The opposite scenario is where “dominance” reigns. Here, holders of certain societal goods use these to
obtain other goods (and avoid bads) despite not fulfilling the requirements of the relevant distributive
mechanisms [67]. Dominance is ubiquitous within the climate discourse. “Substitutability”—the idea
that losses of particular goods can be compensated by increasing access to different types of goods—has
been mainstreamed [61]. However, it is not clear that environmental degradation can be satisfactorily
compensated by financial transfers. The natural environment is often valued for non-material
reasons [60], making financial compensation alone insufficient. Facilitating distributive justice through
CCD requires acknowledgement of the multiple, incommensurable spheres of distribution [67].
3.3. Limitation 3: Procedural Justice Is Ill-Considered
The supremacy of distributive justice is increasingly questioned. Distribution is a crucial social
justice consideration, but cannot be separated from issues of procedure. For individuals and groups to
self-determine what is to be distributed and how, they must be granted recognition—or equality of
status [80]—and participatory opportunities [16].
Unlike distribution, which can be seen as the “economic dimension” of social justice, recognition
resides in the socio-cultural realm [81]. Misrecognition—the absence of recognition—occurs when
individuals and groups are subject to “devaluation, insults, disenfranchisement and oppression” [82]
through formal governance processes or informal customs, norms and behaviours. This is intrinsically
unjust since it can cause psychological harm and/or obstructs people’s potential to flourish within
society [82]. Real-world patterns of misrecognition are often the foundation for distributive
injustices [16].
Distributional outcomes condition patterns of (mis)recognition by determining which individuals
and groups can command respect and status [19]. However, this does not make recognition merely
another type of “good” in need of adequate distribution. Recognition does not suffer from rival
consumption [16] and its socio-cultural constitution means it cannot simply be dispersed by actors
and institutions [83]. Patterns of recognition are embedded within social practices. While powerful
actors and institutions can shape these practices (e.g., a government might alter the law to give
rights to certain groups), they seldom control them [16]. Thus, distribution and recognition, although
interconnected, are not reducible to one another.
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Participation comprises the third pillar of social justice. The extent that individuals and groups can
participate equitably within public life shapes “the course of . . . common activity” [84] and influences
whether they are considered in subsequent distributional patterns [83]. Mechanisms that combine
and analyse different opinions, preferences and interests are crucial. These may not always satisfy
every divergent perspective but reasoned, democratic debate between perspectives presents the best
chance of achieving widespread consensus, or at least mutual tolerance [19]. Climate justice, therefore,
will only be achieved through “shades of grey” and “negotiated compromises” [85].
Participation and distribution share a two-way relationship. Allocations of societal goods and
bads determine which stakeholders have the necessary capacity (e.g., finances and expertise) to make
best use of participatory opportunities [19]. Likewise, participation and recognition share a reciprocal
relationship. Those who go unrecognised are not usually afforded participatory opportunities [81].
Conversely, people’s abilities to command recognition depends on the depth and breadth of their
participatory opportunities [16]. Participatory processes tie together considerations of distribution and
recognition, but are distinct from both.
Empirical research has found that procedural justice is integral to real-life climate justice framings,
with civil society groups [86] and climate change responses [52] emphasising participation and
recognition. Research has begun to reflect these empirical realities (e.g., [18,87]). However, barriers to
procedural justice currently ostracise legitimate social justice claims at international, national [88] and
local levels [30].
To summarise, dominant conceptions of climate justice are unsuitable for the evaluation of CCD
as considerations of context, pluralism and procedural justice are overlooked. This means multiple,
diverse cross-scalar social justice claims are ignored, especially those advocated from sub-national
levels. While these limitations have been discussed elsewhere (e.g., [7,18]), they have not been engaged
with holistically. Frameworks that build on these lessons are absent, which creates a barrier to exploring
social justice within the CCD discourse. The following section seeks to rectify this.
4. A Framework for Evaluating the Social Justice Implications of CCD
A conceptual framework for guiding evaluations of CCD theory and practice is presented
(Figure 1) that overcomes the three limitations highlighted in the previous section. It emphasises:
(1) initiatives through which CCD is being operationalised across governance levels; (2) priority
research areas for exploring the social justice implications of these initiatives; and (3) examples of
research approaches for doing so. As such, it provides pathways for bridging the gap between social
justice theory and practical research.
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At the core of the framework are the three pillars of social justice: recognition, participation
and distribution (see far left column of the table in Figure 1). Issues of recognition and participation
are crucial for understanding how CCD reconciles the competing agendas of multiple stakeholders
operating across scales. The appropriate quality of, and balance between, development, mitigation
and adaptation in initiatives should depend on the values and preferences of the specific stakeholders
involved. Local people targeted by interventions must be afforded status and opportunities to
share their perspectives alongside other stakeholders (e.g., donors, NGOs, governments, and private
organisations). Evaluating recognition and participation will uncover whose belief-systems have won
out at particular time intervals.
The extent to which CCD outcomes exacerbate or alleviate social conflict can be determined
through distributive justice evaluations. Exploring which development, adaptation and mitigation
outcomes are being distributed, and how, is vital. CCD activities and distribution mechanisms
ought to emerge from specific implementation contexts, shaped by stakeholder value systems and
perceived needs. To ensure the integrity of dissimilar distribution spheres, different goods should
also be allocated by unique mechanisms. It might not, for example, be contextually-appropriate
to allocate dissimilar development benefits (e.g., enhanced income-generating opportunities and
improved energy access) using similar principles. Contextually-appropriate distribution mechanisms
for adaptation must consider how and by whom climate impacts are felt. Similarly, decisions regarding
who undertakes mitigation action will likely have their own logic, informed by ethical considerations.
A priori distribution patterns also matter. Often populations who benefit from climate and
development initiatives are those able to command societal resources, whereas disadvantaged groups
are marginalised [30]. CCD initiatives are taking place in underprivileged rural areas of developing
countries [8]. Target populations live in financial poverty, lack education and healthcare and suffer from
various other ailments [93]. Whether and to what extent populations are being afforded recognition
and participatory opportunities under these initiatives is unclear.
Considering CCD’s procedural and distributive justice implications across spatial scales and
governance levels is crucial. CCD actions are being designed and implemented in different places and
at dissimilar governance levels (see top row of the table in Figure 1) [1]. They impact unevenly on
stakeholders operating across diverse spatial and governance dimensions [26]. Likewise, timescales
matter (see black arrow to the right of Figure 1). It has been suggested that community-driven
ecosystem restoration could facilitate adaptation, store carbon and help reduce poverty in rural
sub-Saharan Africa [1]. However, ecosystem restoration benefits can take years to develop, creating
barriers to participation for disadvantaged groups who must focus their labour on activities that yield
immediate benefits in order to survive [71].
Sen’s [19] “capabilities approach” serves as a final arbiter of social justice within the framework
(see white, double-headed arrow in the far left column of the table in Figure 1). It provides an
overarching rationale for considering recognition, participation and distribution as equally important
components. It states that societal arrangements are best judged on how they contribute towards
humans’ multi-faceted, subjective quality of life. Material goods are essential for this but are not the
only, or necessarily most important, dynamics at play [19]. Individuals and groups also depend on
having the necessary political and civil freedoms to optimise resource use, and may even prioritise
these freedoms over possession of material goods [19].
The capabilities approach equates societal arrangements’ “justness” with individuals’ and groups’
abilities to pursue ends that they value [94]. Pursuing a capabilities approach places development
at the heart of climate justice. As previously discussed, climate and development justice are poorly
integrated. The safeguarding and enhancement of capabilities is widely considered the appropriate end
for development justice [93,95]. Integrating climate and development justice is crucial for examining
the “development first” CCD discourse.
CCD implementation contexts condition the extent to which capabilities are enhanced (see black
box around the table in Figure 1). CCD is part of wider political-economic processes underpinned by
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co-operation, competition and conflict between multiple actors, institutions and societal norms [96].
In turn, processes are affected by issues of power, discourse and resource access [97]. Stakeholders’
respective agendas will naturally be influenced by these processes. It has been shown that
political-economic factors have profound impacts for the achievement of development, mitigation
and adaptation [13]. Likewise, CCD goals are routinely influenced and shaped by socio-ecological
environments [98]. The diversity of actors and sources of finance involved in climate governance
makes CCD’s contextual surround particularly complex [97].
5. Exploring the Social Justice Implications of the CDM
The framework developed in section four is now used to explore the cross-scalar, multi-level
social justice implications of the CDM for LDC populations. Countries are classified as LDCs by the
United Nations based on their low gross national income, weak human assets (e.g., education, health,
and nutrition) and economic instability [99]. Limited resource capacities and the sensitivity of their
economies to climate impacts means these countries are acutely vulnerable to climate change [100].
The CDM is proposed as a policy instrument for financing CCD in developing countries, including
the LDCs [101]. It constitutes a market-based approach to mitigation that enables emissions reduction
projects in developing countries to generate Certified Emissions Reductions (CERs). These CERs can
then be traded on the carbon market and bought by developed countries to meet their emissions
reductions obligations under the UNFCCC [102]. It is intended that this will allow developed countries
to achieve cost-effective emissions reductions. CDM projects constitute, for example, renewable energy,
energy efficiency, afforestation and reforestation initiatives. It is considered that projects can encourage
low-carbon development in developing countries [102]. They also have the potential to progress
adaptation; for instance, by enhancing people’s capabilities to deal with climate risks (e.g., through
livelihood diversity, improved incomes) and safeguarding natural resources that provide safety nets
against climate impacts [93].
Drawing on the CDM literature, social justice opportunities afforded to LDC populations are now
discussed. Issues of participation, recognition and distribution at international and sub-national levels
and scales are presented in turn.
5.1. International Implications
5.1.1. Participation and Recognition
A commitment to establish the CDM was agreed by the Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC
and was included in the Kyoto Protocol, which also bound developed countries to emissions reductions
targets [38]. The CDM was first proposed by the US government during the Kyoto negotiations in the
face of considerable opposition from developing countries, including the LDCs. Concern was expressed
that the CDM: (1) might not create emissions reductions which were additional to business-as-usual
scenarios; and (2) could enable developed countries to impose projects on developing countries which
ran counter to their interests [103].
Despite their initial opposition, developing countries agreed to incorporate the CDM within the
Kyoto Protocol. This gave them leverage to reject developed country proposals to include discussion
of voluntary developing country emissions reductions in the Kyoto text [104]. Small-island LDCs
withdrew opposition to the CDM in exchange for the provision of an adaptation fund to be financed
through a levy on CDM projects [104]. African LDCs began to welcome the CDM as a way to increase
development finance [105]. However, Article 12 of the Kyoto Protocol (dubbed the “Kyoto surprise”),
which defines the CDM, was inserted into the negotiating text only days before the Protocol was
agreed. There have been suggestions that this contributed to a “veil of uncertainty” around the CDM
and allowed insufficient time for detailed scrutiny of policy proposals by national delegations [104].
LDCs’ acute vulnerability to climate change meant that they had a particularly strong interest in
securing a global climate agreement at Kyoto [1]. They were reluctant to take negotiating positions
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that might have jeopardised this [105]. Hence, their bargaining position with respect to the CDM
may have been weaker than less vulnerable countries—a barrier to meaningful LDC participation in
international CDM negotiations.
There are also suggestions that LDCs’ were unable to command status and recognition.
For example, Kasa et al. [106] margue that LDC’s weak bargaining power and low institutional capacity
led to their interests being manipulated by developed countries and more resource-wealthy developing
countries within the UNFCCC. LDC delegations have expressed frustration that their perspectives
have been inadequately considered within international climate negotiation processes [107].
LDC bargaining power and recognition was similarly restricted during the post-Kyoto
negotiations that determined specific CDM rules and guidelines. These negotiations culminated
in the 2001 Marrakesh Accords [108]. The Kyoto Protocol required ratification by UNFCCC member
states responsible for 55 per cent of global emissions in 1990 to pass into force [109]. Consequently,
member states accounting for large proportions of 1990 emissions (e.g., Japan and Russia) were able to
dominate negotiations [110].
5.1.2. Distribution
The international distribution of CDM projects is unfavourable to the LDCs. Most CDM projects
are located in middle-income countries (e.g., Brazil, China, India, and Mexico) [94]. Just 1.5% of all CDM
projects have been located in LDCs and 17 (out of 47) LDCs have yet to host a project [94]. Common
constraints related to LDC implementation contexts restrict project development, including limited
institutional capacity and corruption; underdeveloped private sectors [111,112]; poor access to financial
products [113]; restricted awareness of the CDM [114]; low carbon prices; and insufficient mitigation
potential [93]. These constraints run counter to conditions that are valued by CDM investors [115].
Market-based proposals to reform the CDM to encourage LDC involvement are unlikely to succeed
while constraints persist, yet many appear intractable [93]. Project distributions are misaligned with
LDC’s initial expectations for the CDM, especially African countries who considered that it would
increase development finance [105].
5.2. Sub-National Implications
5.2.1. Participation and Recognition
The technical nature of CDM projects exposes skills shortages in LDCs, which are another common
constraint to project development. They also prevent host country stakeholders (e.g., national NGOs,
private organisations, sub-national governments, and local communities) from participating in
the CDM by developing projects or mean they are highly reliant on external assistance to
do so [116]. Indigenous mitigation approaches are not well recognised by CDM modalities,
which favour Westernised, technocratic approaches [117]. This creates barriers to the establishment of
“bottom-up” projects.
LDC governments’ lack of power to bargain with external project developers also restricts their
ability to meaningfully participate in project development. Under CDM regulations, host country
governments have autonomy to dictate sustainable development criteria that projects must adhere to.
Constraints to project development make LDCs unattractive CDM investment locations and force host
governments to compete for CDM finance on investors’ terms [118]. Hence, project developers have
fewer incentives to recognise national development and adaptation priorities in LDCs relative to other
developing countries.
Linked to the scarcity of functional projects, little attention has been paid to local people’s
opportunities to achieve procedural justice through CDM projects in LDCs [119]. Those studies that
do exist show mixed findings [120,121]. Local participation in project design and implementation is
written into the CDM guidelines, but is considered only to have been sporadically achieved [122].
Prouty [123] criticises the tokenistic “notice and comment” model of local people’s participation in
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projects. Poor access to modern communications infrastructure in marginalised areas of developing
countries mean: (1) invitations to input may not be received by local people; and (2) these people
may lack the means to respond to received invitations. Carrere [121] highlights how a CDM
commercial forestry project in Uganda failed to recognise the concerns of local people who were
evicted so that tree plantations could be established. However, Brown et al. [120] show how
a community-based forestry project in Ethiopia facilitated procedural justice opportunities for local
people by legally recognising community ownership of the project and establishing co-operatives
for project management purposes. An absence of specific rules to ensure local participation in CDM
projects may explain these differences [122].
5.2.2. Distribution
Local-level preferences for distribution have not been explored in the CDM literature,
which obstructs analysis of sub-national distributive justice. Some sub-national evaluations of
CDM project distribution patterns in LDCs have been conducted, however, showing mixed results.
Brown et al. [120] indicate how the aforementioned Ethiopian forestry project has generated CCD
benefits for local people by enhancing livelihoods and protecting agricultural lands from flooding.
Likewise, Ayers and Huq [14] discuss a waste-to-compost project in Bangladesh that has improved soil
condition in drought-prone areas and reduced poverty. Both projects have also yielded meaningful
emissions reductions and therefore stand to make global-scale mitigation contributions.
CDM projects may also contribute towards negative-side effects for local people. Prouty [123]
and Carrere [121] highlight that CDM forestry projects in Uganda have led to some local people being
displaced and have interfered with the long-standing tenure arrangements and livelihood activities of
others. Under LDC carbon market projects following very similar implementation regulations to the
CDM, the most marginalised populations (e.g., elderly, disabled, extremely resource poor, women)
have often received fewest benefits. In these projects, powerful local actors have used their superior
resource access to monopolise project benefits for themselves, their friends and families [26]. Hence,
separate distribution spheres have not been kept incommensurable. When projects fail to distribute
benefits in accordance with local expectations, host governments can become wary of approving
additional projects: a further constraint to project development in LDCs [93].
In summary, international-level opportunities for LDCs to participate and command recognition
in CDM design were curtailed by limited government bargaining power and negotiating resources.
Consequently, international project distribution patterns are unfavourable to LDCs and misaligned
with LDC government expectations because the CDM is incompatible with LDC implementation
contexts. Misrecognition of indigenous knowledge and LDC government’s lack of bargaining power
restricts domestic stakeholders’ participation in the few projects that are executed in these countries.
At local-levels, CDM projects that create global-scale mitigation benefits show mixed results in terms of
their propensities to enhance people’s capabilities through participation, recognition and distributions
of development and adaptation outcomes. Developmental problems that see countries classified as
LDCs in the first instance restrict their opportunities to achieve social justice through the CDM.
6. Discussion
CCD professes to be a “development first” approach that aims to help people improve their lives
in the face of climate threats without exacerbating these threats for current and future generations.
However, its potential to live up to the grandiose claims of triple-wins is unclear. This article has sought
to contribute to the nascent critical CCD research agenda by developing and presenting a framework
to guide holistic social justice evaluations of CCD. The framework can help decision-makers adjudicate
between the diverse perspectives of CCD stakeholders and, therefore, complements the use of
physical science approaches and economic methodologies for designing, implementing and evaluating
initiatives. The social justice approach that the framework is predicated on embraces particularism,
pluralism and procedural justice. It provides a way to understand whether and how CCD enhances
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social justice and remedies injustices, rather than seeking “to offer resolutions of questions about the
nature of perfect justice” [19].
Our evaluation of the cross-scalar, multi-level justice implications of the CDM for LDC populations
suggest that achievement of social justice through CCD will not be a given. The CDM case study
showcases interconnections between recognition, participation and distribution, highlighting the
need for frameworks that guide holistic evaluation of all three pillars of social justice. For instance,
at the international level, a priori distribution patterns in the form of LDCs’ acute climate vulnerability
and their governments’ poor resource access translate into limited bargaining power that creates
barriers to meaningful participation. Accordingly, socio-economic conditions that are unique to LDCs
are not adequately recognised through CDM design, which in turn curtails LDCs’ abilities to attract
project investment. Limited government bargaining power at sub-national levels might also contribute
to the likelihood that projects advance patterns of injustice. Resultant unfavourable perceptions of the
CDM within LDCs make the possibility of redressing international distribution patterns more unlikely.
The findings indicate that social justice implications across levels and scales can interact with
another. However, this is obscured in the literature because studies have tended to evaluate social
justice at particular times, spaces and governance dimensions. Developmental problems that see
countries classified as LDCs in the first instance restrict their social justice opportunities under the
CDM. This shows that CCD implementation contexts condition and shape the achievement of social
justice, reinforcing the integral role of context in the framework developed herein.
Understanding the circumstances under which CCD structures and initiatives corroborate or
divert from these findings will be vital in determining whether the concept is well-founded and robust.
The framework developed in this article highlights: (1) priority research areas for exploring social
justice through CCD; and (2) indicative analysis approaches for conducting such analyses, providing
pathways for bridging the gap between social justice theory and practical research (see Figure 1).
Future academic inquiry should examine the key actors, organisations and ideas that shaped the
emergence of the concept, placing their relative power at the centre of analyses. Understanding who
is being recognised and can participate would reveal possible political considerations involved in
the conceptualisation of policy and practice that aims to achieve triple-wins across development,
mitigation and adaptation. The distribution of benefits and any negative side-effects resulting from
this conceptualisation also matters. Evaluation of these aspects would indicate whether CCD is being
used instrumentally, and at whose expense.
Analysis of CCD’s social justice implications at the theoretical-level should go hand-in-hand with
research that seeks to unpack and systematically critique specific initiatives. As Tompkins et al. [11]
point out, the absence of attempts to comprehensively map possible trade-offs that result from practical
CCD initiatives should be rectified with great urgency. This would involve understanding how benefits
and negative side-effects (of different sizes) are distributed within and between individuals and groups.
There is a particular need to evaluate whether and how CCD distributions match local value systems
and perceived needs.
Despite that issues of recognition and participation will shape the composition of distributive
trade-offs, they have not so far been raised as a priority for future CCD research. Exploring
recognition, participation and distribution holistically will be crucial to understanding whether,
in what circumstances and for whom: (1) CCD can achieve triple-wins; (2) supplementary benefits
result from the pursuit of triple-wins that would not be achieved by pursuing single- or double-wins;
and (3) CCD creates negative side-effects that betray its framing as a mechanism for achieving benefits
without incurring losses.
As showcased by the framework developed herein, CCD can be operationalised at and across
different governance levels. However, it is not yet clear how the choice of governance level(s) at which
CCD is pursued might impact upon recognition, participation and distribution. Evaluating the social
justice implications of initiatives originating from different levels and in diverse geographical contexts
could help inform choices. Whether and how results differ across different regions and sectors will be
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important. Likewise, evaluating the social justice implications of CCD over time may alter perceptions
of different initiatives by revealing over which horizons development, mitigation and adaptation wins
can be sustained and negative side-effects averted.
Considering social justice may even make the achievement of triple-wins more likely.
Diverse stakeholders will likely have dissimilar development, mitigation and adaptation and auxiliary
agendas. Concerted attempts to reconcile these agendas could facilitate holistic understanding
of inter-relationships between them. This could encourage compromise, lessen trade-offs and
allow for their synergistic integration. Granting often-marginalised stakeholders recognition and
participatory opportunities at local levels could encourage innovation [40]. Conversely, failure to
achieve reconciliation could isolate stakeholders with different priorities from one another and fuel
conflict which could destabilise relationships that are integral for achieving CCD goals.
7. Conclusions
The CCD cart is currently being put before the horse. As the case of the CDM shows, triple-win
strategies and interventions are increasingly operationalised with little understanding of their
implications for different individuals and groups. These initiatives risk adopting predefined ideas of
socially just solutions, yet their actual social justice implications may be highly questionable. It is not
yet clear for whom and at which governance levels the pursuit of triple-wins is creating procedural
justice opportunities and valued benefits, nor whether these benefits can be generated and sustained
without incurring negative-side effects. In this article, a framework has been developed that can be
used to guide holistic social justice analyses of CCD and help provide much needed clarity.
As the CCD discourse matures and gains traction, a future research agenda that systematically
critiques the origins and operationalisation of the pursuit of triple-wins is needed to facilitate improved
understandings of whether and how it should be used to underpin a new development landscape.
CCD policymakers and practitioners should adopt a learning-by-doing approach and proceed with
caution until these processes and implications are better understood.
Acknowledgments: The authors are grateful for funding support from the Centre for Climate Change Economics
and Policy (University of Leeds, UK) (Grant number: ES/K006576/1).
Author Contributions: Benjamin T. Wood collected and analysed the literature and data; and wrote the
article, with guidance, feedback and editorial contributions from Andrew J. Dougill, Lindsay C. Stringer and
Claire H. Quinn.
Conflicts of Interest: The authors declare no conflict of interest.
References
1. Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. Climate Change 2014: Impacts, Adaptation, and Vulnerability.
Contribution of Working Group II to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change;
Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, UK; New York, NY, USA, 2014.
2. Nunan, F. Making Climate Compatible Development Happen; Routledge: London, UK, 2017.
3. Bickersteth, S.; Dupar, M.; Espinosa, C.; Huhtala, A.; Maxwell, S.; Pacha, M.J.; Sheikh, A.T.; Wesselink, C.
Mainstreaming Climate Compatible Development; Climate and Development Knowledge Network: London,
UK, 2017. Available online: https://cdkn.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/Mainstreaming-climate-
compatible-development-web-final.pdf (accessed on 10 September 2017).
4. Bryan, E.; Ringler, C.; Okoba, B.; Koo, J.; Herrero, M.; Silvestri, S. Can agriculture support climate change
adaptation, greenhouse gas mitigation and rural livelihoods? Insights from Kenya. Clim. Chang. 2013, 118,
151–165. [CrossRef]
5. Mitchell, T.; Maxwell, S. Defining Climate Compatible Development; CDKN Policy Brief; CDKN: London, UK, 2010.
6. Stringer, L.C.; Dougill, A.J.; Dyer, J.C.; Vincent, K.; Fritzsche, F.; Leventon, J.; Falcão, M.P.; Manyakaidze, P.;
Syampungani, S.; Powell, P. Advancing climate compatible development: lessons from southern Africa.
Reg. Environ. Chang. 2014, 14, 713–725. [CrossRef]
7. Fisher, S. The emerging geographies of climate justice. Geogr. J. 2015, 181, 73–82. [CrossRef]
Sustainability 2018, 10, 211 16 of 20
8. Climate and Development Knowledge Network. Inside Stories on Climate Compatible Development.
Available online: http://cdkn.org/cdkn_series/inside-story/?loclang=en_gb (accessed on 4 February 2015).
9. Department for International Development. DFID Research: Combating Climate Change Is a Unique
Challenge for Development Research. 2011. Available online: www.gov.uk/government/case-studies/
dfid-research-combating-climate-change-is-a-unique-challenge-for-development-research (accessed on
22 December 2017).
10. United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification. Climate Change in the African
Drylands: Options and Opportunities for Adaptation and Mitigation. 2009. Available online:
http://www.unccd.int/Lists/SiteDocumentLibrary/Publications/Climate%20Change%20Adaptation%
20and%20Mitigation%20final.pdf (accessed on 9 August 2016).
11. Tompkins, E.L.; Mensah, A.; King, L.; Long, T.K.; Lawson, E.T.; Hutton, C.W.; Hoang, V.A.; Gordon, C.;
Fish, M.; Dyer, J. An Investigation of the Evidence of Benefits from Climate Compatible Development; Centre for
Climate Change Economics and Policy Working Paper No. 124; Sustainability Research Institute: London,
UK, 2013.
12. Käkönen, M.; Lebel, L.; Karhunmaa, K.; Dany, V.; Try, T. Rendering climate change governable in the Least
Developed Countries: Policy narratives and expert technologies in Cambodia. Forum Dev. Stud. 2014, 41,
351–376. [CrossRef]
13. Tanner, T.; Mensah, A.; Lawson, E.T.; Gordon, C.; Godfrey-Wood, R.; Cannon, T. Political Economy of
Climate Compatible Development: Artisanal Fisheries and Climate Change in Ghana; IDS Working Paper No. 446;
Institute of Development Studies: Brighton, UK, 2014.
14. Ayers, J.M.; Huq, S. The value of linking mitigation and adaptation: A case study of Bangladesh.
Environ. Manag. 2009, 43, 753–764. [CrossRef] [PubMed]
15. Ellis, K.; Cambray, A.; Lemma, A. Drivers and Challenges for Climate Compatible Development; CDKN Working
Paper; CDKN: London, UK, 2013.
16. Schlosberg, D. Defining Environmental Justice: Theories, Movements, and Nature; Oxford University Press:
New York, NY, USA, 2007.
17. Fraser, N. Social Justice in the Age of Identity Politics: Redistribution, Recognition, and Participation. In The
Tanner Lectures on Human Values; Peterson, G.B., Ed.; University of Utah Press: Salt Lake City, UT, USA, 1998.
18. Paavola, J.; Adger, W.N. Fair adaptation to climate change. Ecol. Econ. 2006, 56, 594–609. [CrossRef]
19. Sen, A. The Idea of Justice; Harvard University Press: Cambridge, MA, USA, 2009.
20. Curry, J.A.; Webster, P.J. Climate science and the uncertainty monster. Bull. Am. Meteorol. Soc. 2011, 92,
1667–1682. [CrossRef]
21. Klein, R.J.; Schipper, E.L.F.; Dessai, S. Integrating mitigation and adaptation into climate and development
policy: Three research questions. Environ. Sci. Policy 2005, 8, 579–588. [CrossRef]
22. Mustalahti, I.; Bolin, A.; Boyd, E.; Paavola, J. Can REDD+ reconcile local priorities and needs with global
mitigation benefits? Lessons from Angai Forest, Tanzania. Ecol. Soc. 2012, 17, 16.
23. Cavanagh, C.; Benjaminsen, T.A. Virtual nature, violent accumulation: The ‘spectacular failure’ of carbon
offsetting at a Ugandan National Park. Geoforum 2014, 56, 55–65. [CrossRef]
24. Atela, J.; Quinn, C.; Minang, P.; Duguma, L. Implementing REDD+ in the context of integrated conservation
and development projects: Leveraging empirical lessons. Land Use Policy 2015, 48, 329–340. [CrossRef]
25. Sova, C.; Vervoort, J.; Thornton, T.; Helfgott, A.; Matthews, D.; Chaudhury, A. Exploring farmer preference
shaping in international agricultural climate change adaptation regimes. Environ. Sci. Policy 2015, 54,
463–474. [CrossRef]
26. Mathur, V.N.; Afionis, S.; Paavola, J.; Dougill, A.J.; Stringer, L.C. Experiences of host communities with
carbon market projects: Towards multi-level climate justice. Clim. Policy 2014, 14, 42–62. [CrossRef]
27. Mustalahti, I.; Rakotonarivo, O.S. REDD+ and empowered deliberative democracy: Learning from Tanzania.
World Dev. 2014, 59, 199–211. [CrossRef]
28. Dessai, S.; van der Sluijs, J.P. Uncertainty and Climate Change Adaptation: A Scoping Study; Copernicus Institute
for Sustainable Development and Innovation, Department of Science Technology and Society: Utrecht,
The Netherlands, 2007.
29. Devarajan, S. Africa’s statistical tragedy. Rev. Income Wealth 2013, 59, S9–S15. [CrossRef]
30. Barrett, S. Local level climate justice? Adaptation finance and vulnerability reduction. Glob. Environ. Chang.
2013, 23, 1819–1829. [CrossRef]
Sustainability 2018, 10, 211 17 of 20
31. O’Brien, K.L.; Leichenko, R.M. Winners and losers in the context of global change. Ann. Assoc. Am. Geogr.
2003, 93, 89–103. [CrossRef]
32. Dyer, J.C.; Leventon, J.; Stringer, L.C.; Dougill, A.J.; Syampungani, S.; Nshimbi, M.; Chama, F.; Kafwifwi, A.
Partnership models for climate compatible development: Experiences from Zambia. Resources 2013, 2, 1–25.
[CrossRef]
33. Freeman, R.E. Strategic Management: A Stakeholder Approach; Pitman: Boston, MA, USA, 1984.
34. Wood, B.T.; Dougill, A.J.; Quinn, C.H.; Stringer, L.C. Exploring power and procedural justice within climate
compatible development design: whose preferences are being considered? J. Environ. Dev. 2016, 25, 363–395.
[CrossRef]
35. Hulme, M. Why We Disagree About Climate Change; Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, UK, 2011.
36. Pieterse, J.N. Development Theory; Sage: London, UK, 2010.
37. Morgan, J.; Waskow, D. A new look at climate equity in the UNFCCC. Clim. Policy 2014, 14, 17–22. [CrossRef]
38. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. Mitigation. 2016. Available online:
http://unfccc.int/focus/mitigation/items/7169.php (accessed on 26 April 2016).
39. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. Adaptation. 2016. Available online:
http://unfccc.int/adaptation/items/4159.php (accessed on 26 April 2016).
40. Nyong, A.; Adesina, F.; Elasha, B.O. The value of indigenous knowledge in climate change mitigation and
adaptation strategies in the African Sahel. Mitig. Adapt. Strateg. Glob. Chang. 2007, 12, 787–797. [CrossRef]
41. Beck, S.; Borie, M.; Chilvers, J.; Esguerra, A.; Heubach, K.; Hulme, M.; Lidskog, R.; Lövrband, E.; Marquard, E.;
Miller, C.; et al. Towards a Reflexive Turn in the Governance of Global Environmental Expertise. Ecol. Perspect.
Sci. Soc. 2014, 23, 80.
42. Ford, J.D.; Vanderbilt, W.; Berrang-Ford, L. Authorship in IPCC AR5 and its implications for content: Climate
change and Indigenous populations in WGII. Clim. Chang. 2012, 113, 201–213. [CrossRef] [PubMed]
43. Sutter, C.; Parreno, J.C. Does the current Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) deliver its sustainable
development claim? An analysis of officially registered CDM projects. Clim. Chang. 2007, 84, 75–90.
[CrossRef]
44. Blom, B.; Sunderland, T.; Murditarso, D. Getting REDD to work locally: Lessons learned from integrated
conservation and development projects. Environ. Sci. Policy 2010, 13, 164–172. [CrossRef]
45. Wood, B.T.; Quinn, C.H.; Stringer, L.C.; Dougill, A.J. Investigating climate compatible development outcomes
and their implications for distributive justice. Evidence from Malawi. Environ. Manag. 2017, 60, 436–453.
[CrossRef] [PubMed]
46. Suckall, N.; Tompkins, E.L.; Stringer, L. Identifying trade-offs between adaptation, mitigation and
development in community responses to climate and socio-economic stresses: Evidence from Zanzibar,
Tanzania. Appl. Geogr. 2014, 46, 111–121. [CrossRef]
47. Gold Standard. CDM Executive Board Call for Public Input in the Inclusion of Co-Benefits and
Negative Impacts in CDM Documentation. Available online: http://cdm.unfccc.int/public_inputs/2011/
sustainability_benefits/cfi/YO7AGC7N4U4EO0LLKTS1UCWMU3Z3E9 (accessed on 4 February 2014).
48. UN-REDD. Policy Brief on REDD Safeguards. 2013. Available online: http://www.un-redd.org/
Newsletter35/PolicyBriefonREDDSafeguards/tabid/105808/Default.aspx (accessed on 4 February 2015).
49. Barnett, J.; O’NEILL, S. Maladaptation. Glob. Environ. Chang. 2010, 20, 211–213. [CrossRef]
50. Mcshane, T.O.; Hirsch, P.D.; Trung, T.C.; Songorwa, A.N.; Kinzig, A.; Monteferri, B.; Mutekanga, D.;
Thang, H.V.; Dammert, J.L.; Pulgar-Vidal, M. Hard choices: Making trade-offs between biodiversity
conservation and human well-being. Biol. Conserv. 2011, 144, 966–972. [CrossRef]
51. Paavola, J. Science and social justice in the governance of adaptation to climate change. Environ. Politics 2008,
17, 644–659. [CrossRef]
52. Bulkeley, H.; Carmin, J.; Broto, V.C.; Edwards, G.A.; Fuller, S. Climate justice and global cities: Mapping the
emerging discourses. Glob. Environ. Chang. 2013, 23, 914–925. [CrossRef]
53. Ngwadla, X. An operational framework for equity in the 2015 Agreement. Clim. Policy 2015, 14, 8–16.
[CrossRef]
54. Scottish Government. Climate Justice Fund. 2016. Available online: http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Topics/
Environment/climatechange/climatejusticefund/ProjectMonitoring/SuccessfulProjects (accessed on
4 February 2016).
55. Liu, F. Environmental Justice Analysis: Theories, Methods, and Practice; CRC Press: Boca Raton, FL, USA, 2010.
Sustainability 2018, 10, 211 18 of 20
56. Davy, B. Fairness as compassion: Towards a less unfair facility siting policy. Risk Issues Health Saf. Environ.
1996, 7, 105.
57. Hayek, F. The Constitution of Liberty; Chicago University Press: Chicago, IL, USA, 1978.
58. Nozick, R.L. Anarchy, State and Utopia; Basic Books: New York, NY, USA, 1974.
59. Rawls, J. A Theory of Justice; Harvard University Press: Cambridge, MA, USA, 1971.
60. Adger, W.N.; Barnett, J.; Chapin, F.S., III; Ellemor, H. This must be the place: Underrepresentation of identity
and meaning in climate change decision-making. Glob. Environ. Politics 2011, 11, 1–25. [CrossRef]
61. Klinsky, S.; Dowlatabadi, H. Conceptualizations of justice in climate policy. Clim. Policy 2009, 9, 88–108.
[CrossRef]
62. Baer, P. Toward justice in adaptation to climate change. In Fairness in Adaptation to Climate Change; Adger, N.,
Paavola, J., Huq, S., Mace, M.J., Eds.; MIT Press: Cambridge, UK, 2006.
63. Bromley, D.W.; Paavola, J. Economics, Ethics, and Environmental Policy: Contested Choices; Malden, M.A., Ed.;
Blackwell: Oxford, UK, 2002.
64. Adger, W.N. Scales of governance and environmental justice for adaptation and mitigation of climate change.
J. Int. Dev. 2001, 13, 921–931. [CrossRef]
65. Gaillard, J.C. Vulnerability, capacity and resilience: Perspectives for climate and development policy.
J. Int. Dev. 2010, 22, 218–232. [CrossRef]
66. Parks, B.C.; Roberts, J.T. Climate change, social theory and justice. Theory Cult. Soc. 2010, 27, 134–166.
[CrossRef]
67. Walzer, M. Spheres of Justice: A Defense of Pluralism and Equality; Basic Books: London, UK, 1983.
68. Kurtz, H.E. Scale frames and counter-scale frames: Constructing the problem of environmental injustice.
Political Geogr. 2003, 22, 887–916. [CrossRef]
69. Terry, G. No climate justice without gender justice: An overview of the issues. Gend. Dev. 2009, 17, 5–18.
[CrossRef]
70. Büchs, M.; Bardsley, N.; Duwe, S. Who bears the brunt? Distributional effects of climate change mitigation
policies. Crit. Soc. Policy 2011, 31, 285–307.
71. Paavola, J. Livelihoods, vulnerability and adaptation to climate change in Morogoro, Tanzania.
Environ. Sci. Policy 2008, 11, 642–654. [CrossRef]
72. Barrett, S. The necessity of a multiscalar analysis of climate justice. Prog. Hum. Geogr. 2013, 37, 215–233.
[CrossRef]
73. Bell, D. Communitarianism. In The Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy; Zalta, E.N., Ed.; The Metaphysics
Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language and Information Stanford University: Stanford, CA, USA,
2012. Available online: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/communitarianism/#UniVerPar (accessed on
4 February 2015).
74. Baxter, B. Theory of Ecological Justice; Routledge: London, UK, 2004.
75. Weston, P.; Hong, R.; Kabore, C.; Kull, C.A. Farmer-Managed Natural Regeneration Enhances Rural
Livelihoods in Dryland West Africa. Environ. Manag. 2015, 5, 1402–1417. [CrossRef] [PubMed]
76. Chhatre, A.; Agrawal, A. Trade-offs and synergies between carbon storage and livelihood benefits from
forest commons. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. USA 2009, 106, 17667–17670. [CrossRef] [PubMed]
77. Lamont, J.; Favor, C. Distributive Justice. In The Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy; Zalta, E.N., Ed.;
The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language and Information Stanford University:
Stanford, CA, USA, 2012. Available online: http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2014/entries/justice-
distributive (accessed on 4 February 2015).
78. Kelman, I. Hearing local voices from small island developing states for climate change. Local Environ. 2010,
15, 605–619. [CrossRef]
79. Caney, S. Cosmopolitan justice, responsibility, and global climate change. Leiden J. Int. Law 2005, 18, 747–775.
[CrossRef]
80. Miller, D.; Walzer, M. Pluralism, Justice, and Equality; Oxford University Press: Oxford, UK, 1995.
81. Fraser, N. Reframing justice in a globalizing world. New Left Rev. 2005, 36, 69–88.
82. Tschakert, P. Digging Deep for Justice: A Radical Re-imagination of the Artisanal Gold Mining Sector in
Ghana. Antipode 2009, 41, 706–740. [CrossRef]
83. Young, M.I. Justice and the Politics of Difference; Princeton University Press: Princeton, NJ, USA, 1990.
Sustainability 2018, 10, 211 19 of 20
84. Gould, C. Diversity and democracy: Representing differences. In Democracy and Difference: Contesting the
Boundaries of the Political; Benhabib, S., Ed.; Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, UK, 1996.
85. Sovacool, B.K. Adaptation: The complexity of climate justice. Nat. Clim. Chang. 2013, 3, 960. [CrossRef]
86. Derman, B.B. Climate governance, justice, and transnational civil society. Clim. Policy 2014, 14, 23–41.
[CrossRef]
87. Comim, F. Climate injustice and development: A capability perspective. Development 2008, 51, 344–349.
[CrossRef]
88. Mace, M.J. Adaptation in the UNFCCC. In Fairness in Adaptation to Climate Change; Adger, N., Paavola, J.,
Huq, S., Mace, M.J., Eds.; MIT Press: Cambridge, MA, USA, 2006.
89. Fisher, S.; Mohun, R. Low Carbon Resilient Development and Gender Equality in the Least Developed
Countries; International Institute for Environment and Development Issue Paper; International Institute for
Environment and Development (IIED): London, UK, 2015.
90. Zhang, J.; Xu, L.; Li, X. Review on the externalities of hydropower: A comparison between large and small
hydropower projects in Tibet based on the CO2 equivalent. Renew. Sustain. Energy Rev. 2015, 50, 176–185.
[CrossRef]
91. Wood, B.T.; Sallu, S.M.; Paavola, J. Can CDM finance energy access in Least Developed Countries? Evidence
from Tanzania. Clim. Policy 2016, 16, 456–473. [CrossRef]
92. UNEP-RISOE. CDM Projects by Host Region. 2016. Available online: http://cdmpipeline.org/cdm-projects-
region.htm#1 (accessed on 26 April 2016).
93. United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). Human Development Report; UNDP: New York, NY, USA, 2015.
94. Sen, A. Development as Freedom; Oxford University Press: Oxford, UK, 2001.
95. United Nations. Sustainable Development Goals. 2015. Available online: https://sustainabledevelopment.
un.org/?menu=1300 (accessed on 26 April 2016).
96. Quan, J.; Næss, L.O.; Newsham, A.; Sitoe, A.; Fernandez, M.C. Carbon Forestry and Climate Compatible
Development in Mozambique: A Political Economy Analysis; IDS Working Paper No. 448; Institute of
Development Studies: Brighton, UK, 2014.
97. Tanner, T.; Allouche, J. Towards a new political economy of climate change and development. IDS Bull. 2011,
42, 1–14. [CrossRef]
98. Moser, S.C.; Ekstrom, J.A. A framework to diagnose barriers to climate change adaptation. Proc. Natl. Acad.
Sci. USA 2010, 107, 22026–22031. [CrossRef] [PubMed]
99. UN-OHRLLS. About LDCs. 2017. Available online: http://unohrlls.org/about-ldcs/ (accessed on 26 April 2016).
100. Maplecroft. Climate Change Vulnerability Index. 2011. Available online: http://maplecroft.com/about/
news/ccvi.html (accessed on 9 January 2014).
101. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. Benefits of the Clean Development Mechanism.
2012. Available online: http://cdm.unfccc.int/about/dev_ben/ABC_2012.pdf (accessed on 16 November 2013).
102. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. What Is the CDM? 2016. Available online:
http://cdm.unfccc.int/about/index.html (accessed on 26 April 2016).
103. Delay, T.; Grubb, M.; Willan, C.; Counsell, T. Global Carbon Mechanisms: Emerging Lessons and Implications;
Carbon Trust: London, UK, 2009.
104. Oberthür, S.; Ott, H.E. The Kyoto Protocol: International Climate Policy for the 21st Century; Springer: New York,
NY, USA, 2012.
105. Mwandosya, M.J. Survival Emissions: A Perspective from the South on Global Climate Change Negotiations;
The Centre for Energy, Environment, Science and Technology: Dar-es-Salaam, Tanzania, 2000.
106. Kasa, S.; Gullberg, A.T.; Heggelund, G. The Group of 77 in the international climate negotiations: recent
developments and future directions. Int. Environ. Agreem. Politics Law Econ. 2008, 8, 113–127. [CrossRef]
107. Tangen, K. The climate change negotiations: Buenos Aires and beyond. Glob. Environ. Chang. 1999, 9,
175–178. [CrossRef]
108. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). The Marrakesh Accords. 2001.
Available online: http://unfccc.int/cop7/documents/accords_draft.pdf (accessed on 26 April 2016).
109. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). The Kyoto Protocol. 1998. Available
online: http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/items/2830.php (accessed on 26 April 2016).
110. Vespa, M. Climate change 2001: Kyoto at Bonn and Marrakech. Ecol. Law Q. 2002, 29, 395–420.
Sustainability 2018, 10, 211 20 of 20
111. De Lopez, T.; Tim, P.; Iyadomi, K.; Santos, S.; Mcintosh, B. Clean Development Mechanism and Least
Developed Countries: Changing the rules for greater participation. J. Environ. Dev. 2009, 18, 436–452.
[CrossRef]
112. Byigero, A.; Clancy, J.; Skutsch, M. CDM in Sub-Saharan Africa and the prospects of the Nairobi Framework
Initiative. Clim. Policy 2010, 10, 181–189. [CrossRef]
113. Sieghart, L. Unilateral clean development mechanism—An approach for a least developed country?
The case of Yemen. Environ. Sci. Policy 2009, 12, 198–203. [CrossRef]
114. Gilau, A.; van Buskirk, R.; Small, M. Enabling optimal energy options under the Clean Development
Mechanism. Energy Policy 2007, 35, 5526–5534. [CrossRef]
115. Niederberger, A.; Saner, R. Exploring the relationship between FDI flows and CDM potential. Transnatl. Corp.
2005, 14, 1–40.
116. Timilsina, G.R.; de Gouvelle, C.; Thioye, M.; Dayo, F.B. Clean Development Mechanism Potential and
Challenges in Sub-Saharan Africa. Mitig. Adapt. Strateg. Glob. Chang. 2010, 15, 93–111. [CrossRef]
117. Boyd, E.; Goodman, M. The Clean Development Mechanism as ethical development? J. Int. Dev. 2011, 23,
836–854. [CrossRef]
118. Olsen, K.H. The clean development mechanism’s contribution to sustainable development. Clim. Chang.
2007, 84, 59–73. [CrossRef]
119. Karakosta, C.; Marinakis, V.; letsou, P.; Psarras, J. Does the CDM offer sustainable development benefits or
not? Int. J. Sustain. Dev. World Ecol. 2013, 20, 1–8. [CrossRef]
120. Brown, D.; Dettmann, P.; Rinaudo, T.; Tefera, H.; Tofu, A. Poverty Alleviation and Environmental Restoration
Using the Clean Development Mechanism: A Case Study from Humbo, Ethiopia. Environ. Manag. 2011, 48,
322–333. [CrossRef] [PubMed]
121. Carrere, R. Carbon sink plantation in Uganda: Evicting people for making space for trees. In Upsetting the
Offset: The Political Economy of Carbon Markets; Böhm, S., Dabhi, S., Eds.; MacFly Books: London, UK, 2010.
122. Boyd, E.; Hultman, N.; Roberts, J.T.; Corbera, E.; Cole, J.; Bozmoski, A.; Ebeling, J.; Tippmann, R.; Mann, P.;
Brown, K.; et al. Reforming the CDM for sustainable development: Lessons learned and policy futures.
Environ. Sci. Policy 2009, 12, 820–831. [CrossRef]
123. Prouty, A. The clean development mechanism and it’s implications for climate justice. Colum. J. Envtl. L.
2009, 34, 513.
© 2018 by the authors. Licensee MDPI, Basel, Switzerland. This article is an open access
article distributed under the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons Attribution
(CC BY) license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
